turn toward direct, horizontal democratic organization outside of the representative structures of electoral politics and oriented toward a horizon of liberation.
Despite Autonomia's widespread influence on political action and post-Marxist scholarship, it has been surprisingly slow to address planetary change and environmental politics. With a focus on cognitive capitalism, many autonomist scholars have downplayed or fully ignored the ecological dimensions of post-Fordism-its foundations in extractive energy economies, its links to the accelerating financialization of nature under the banner of so-called green capitalism, its harnessing of nonhuman capacities, and its wildly uneven toxic geographies. This lack of engagement is regrettable given that, we propose, autonomist insights hold great promise for understanding both the transformed relation between capital and nonhuman natures in post-Fordism and the many political movements that have emerged in response.
More significantly, the era of anthropogenic global change named by the Anthropocene poses profound challenges to a politics of autonomy in the present. The nomination of the Anthropocene as a new geologic epoch shines a spotlight on the immense scale and consequence of human transformations of earth systems. These changes cannot be undone; we have produced a new nature and a new humanity, the contours of which we are still discerning. That responsibility for these transformations is uneven has been widely noted, and other names-Capitalocene, Plantationocene-have been proposed to identify specific social actors and forces that have brought us to the present juncture. These names matter, but none of them alter a key point: we may now be geological actors, but that has only further revealed our entanglement with the nonhuman world, the impossibility of separating the anthropos from geology, ecology, and climate. In the context of these entanglements it is not clear what autonomy means, politically or ontologically. Indeed, even as the figure of the human is inflated in some Anthropocene narratives, it has been radically decentered in others, as inhuman materialities, temporalities, and genealogies come to the fore that precede, exceed, and subtend human life. "Considering the human within geologic time," Kathryn Yusoff (2015: 388) writes, "poses the problem of thinking an inhuman milieu, both before, after and internal to 'us'" (italics added). Placed alongside recognition of the consequences of anthropogenic change, this displacement of the human demands that "life" be understood not in terms of humanity as a unified category but in terms of what Elizabeth A. Povinelli (this issue) describes as "more or less densely compacted forms and modes of existence" that nei-ther begin nor end with "us," with consequences not just for the most hubristic fantasies of geoengineering but also for what constitutes the common, where and in what potentiality is located, how autonomy should be understood, and who and what is named by the anthropos.
It is no longer evident that key terms found in the autonomist lexiconspecies being, the common, multitude, potentia-survive the challenge of the Anthropocene unchanged or that the production of subjectivity (a cornerstone of autonomist thought) can be understood solely in terms of language, habit, or gesture. It may therefore be necessary to think beyond the struggles of the factory floor, or those of the cognitariat today, to imagine and think from other sites of struggle, other forms of solidarity, and other experiments in "commoning." These bring into play unfamiliar actors and unacknowledged geographies: sites of extraction and circuits of waste, indigenous communities and territories, rising seas and toxic landscapes that are materially present within the informationalized economies of global capitalism, but often invisible to those working within them. We might say, then, that the Anthropocene names autonomist Marxism's unthought, an unthought that intrudes on its political imaginaries. What happens to autonomism if it begins to question the autonomy of the human? Or if it leaves its privileged sites in the global North? And what does it mean, in the context of cognitive capitalism's toxic ecologies, to advance a politics based on the progressive expansion of human productive capacities? Might we be compelled to recognize, as Isabelle Stengers (this issue) forcefully asserts, that capitalism may lead only to catastrophe and barbarism? In sum, the conjuncture named by the Anthropocene would seem to push Autonomia to its conceptual and political limits.
Yet if the Anthropocene describes a blindness in autonomist thought and politics, it is a blindness rooted in the historical tensions that gave rise to the Autonomia movement, in a manner that is constitutive but contingent. Focusing for the moment on the movement's epicenter in Italy, we can see that the politics of Autonomia were rooted in the geographical specificity of workers' experience in postwar Italian industry. As the country's productive capacity and share of world trade ballooned throughout the 1950s and early 1960s, commentators hailed the "economic miracle" that transformed Italy from a largely rural economy into an industrial powerhouse centered on the automotive industry (De Rosa 2008c; Wright 2002: 6) . This "miracle" was predicated on an intensification of exploitation: Italy's comparative advantage lay in its low labor costs, enabled by a large industrial reserve army of migrant workers from the impoverished South (Berardi 2007: 150; De Rosa 2008c: 102) . The workerist movements gathered under the banner of Potere Operaio (Workers' Power) diagnosed the crisis at the heart of the economic miracle, revealing its roots in the hyperexploitation of labor and the uneven geographies of Italian development. In the "hot autumn" of 1969, widespread strikes, factory occupations, and sabotage rocked the manufacturing sector, resulting in the loss of 40 million worker hours that autumn alone (Berardi 2007: 149; De Rosa 2008c: 108) . Capital flight intensified as the contracts won by labor kicked in the following year, and a shortage of money capital prompted rising inflation and a contraction of credit (De Rosa 2008c: 108). The notion of labor power's autonomy that would inflect autonomist thought was therefore rooted in the concrete experience of workers' power as it was exercised on the shop floor and reverberated throughout the banking and financial sectors.
Borrowing from Antonio Negri's (1991) reading of Spinoza, we might rename the so-called Italian miracle "the Italian anomaly." Negri finds in Spinoza's metaphysics a radical expression of "the Dutch anomaly," describing the seventeenth-century Dutch Republic's exceptional rate of economic growth, precipitated by an emerging industrial capitalism and an expanding colonial regime; the coinciding golden age of Dutch humanism, in stark contrast to the baroque reaction in France and elsewhere; and its constitutional structure, which stood apart from European monarchies. In this context, Negri (1991: 8) argues, Spinoza recognized the multitude as an emerging political and economic force underpinning both the republican constitution and Dutch industry: "It is on the basis of this material force that Spinoza's philosophy is comprehensible, as power and as an anomaly with respect to all modern rationalism, which is irremediably conditioned and restricted by the limitations of mercantilist development." By formulating a philosophy of democracy grounded in the collective forces of social production, Spinoza's thought "becomes a 'savage' anomaly," amplifying the revolutionary power of a multitude oriented toward liberation (xix). It is in this sense that, Negri argues, Spinoza produces a "philosophy of the future" adequate to the struggles of the 1970s (8).
Paraphrasing Negri, it is on the basis of the material forces manifest in the "Italian anomaly" that the philosophy of workers' autonomy is comprehensible. That Italian comparative advantage hinged on a docile and inexpensive labor force placed workers in a position of immediate economic power, which was exercised through wildcat strikes and factory takeovers without the mediation of union bureaucracy. It was on the basis of the demonstrated ability of the working class to destabilize the politics of economic growth that the demands for autonomy and the rejection of the Left estab-lishment's collusion with the interests of capital were solidified, giving rise, in 1973, to the dispersal of Potere Operaio into a loose network of social movements under the heading of Autonomia Operaio (Workers' Autonomy). To borrow Ian Baucom's (2005: 24) phrase from a different context, we can see why, for Negri, Spinoza's milieu constituted a kind of "non-synchronous contemporaneity" with the struggles of 1970s Italy, when the multitude emerged again as a decisive force that both exceeded the representational structures of capital and the state and had underpinned them all along.
The Movement of '77, out of which many of the leading figures in Autonomia's intellectual legacy would emerge, expanded the politics of refusal inaugurated with workerist struggles into a general refusal of capitalist social relations. In an economy in which technological innovations in production were stifled in favor of intensified exploitation, Autonomia envisioned an application of the general intellect toward the overall reduction of work and a politics of cultural transformation (Berardi 2007: 156) . Not merely advancing a set of political demands, "the movement of '77 was itself a rich, independent, and conflictual productive force," deriving its power from the new forms of social cooperation and technical capacities that would become the foundation of the post-Fordist economy (Castellano et al. 1996: 234) . In that regard, it prefigured the counterrevolutionary response that followed. As Paolo Virno (1996: 246) put it, the movement "addressed the same problems that neoliberalism would later address, but sought different solutions. . . . [It] represented the only vindication of an alternative path for the management of the phase of the end of 'full employment.'" And yet if we expand our perspective on the Autonomia movement beyond the Italian autoworkers, other forces at work in its constitution may come into focus that disturb this narrative. For example, in Italy, the postwar boom and the maintenance of low wages via migrant factory labor depended on an unprecedented transformation of agriculture and energy production accomplished between the 1950s and 1970s. The national plan for economic development in the 1950s, which drove the industrialization process, centered on the expansion of the country's energy base, chiefly through a shift from hydropower to fossil fuels. During that decade Italy experienced its own oil and gas boom, which dramatically changed the country's prospects in the context of an international energy transition from coal to oil: "Italy's greater proximity to the major oil fields and refining centers meant lower transport costs than those borne by the others [other industrial countries in Europe], and Italy's discoveries of oil and gas at home gave it a further edge" (De Rosa 2008b: 135). By 1975 74.5 percent of the nation's energy came from oil, with natural gas in second place (137). This new dependence on oil drew Italy more fully into the global economy, making it particularly vulnerable to the oil crises of 1973 and 1979 that coincided with labor unrest to undercut the politics of growth (De Rosa 2008b: 137; 2008c) .
Simultaneous with the energy boom was an agricultural revolution that one commentator called "the most sweeping renewal ever in Italian agriculture" (Mario Bandini, quoted in De Rosa 2008a: 71). The highly-contested push to mechanize farming in the 1950s, enabled in large part by a landmark agreement between Fiat and farming industry groups, helped to increase productivity and reorient production toward market imperatives while dramatically reducing farm employment. The resulting outflow of labor from the south to northern factories became the motor of industrial production. This migrant labor force was also the lever used by management to keep wages low and later, beginning in 1968 and 1969, would become "the mass-base at the forefront of the union struggle (and the base, too, for organized political revolution)" (Berardi 2007: 150) . In other words, the Italian anomaly sprang not solely from labor power employed in the factories but from its convergence with the "dead ecologies" (Huber 2013 ) concentrated in fossil fuels and the unparalleled transformation of Italian landscapes through agricultural modernization and deruralization.
Understanding the new forces of production at work in the Italian anomaly requires attending to the concomitant intensification of nonhuman productivity that accompanied the mass mobilization of labor power in the factories. These transformations were not concentrated only in Italy, but rather unfolded in a new era of globalization that transformed geographies of production and dramatically intensified resource extraction and emissions on a global scale. That the workerist and autonomist struggles erupted around the industrial production of automobiles, the quintessential technology of the Anthropocene and its constitutive form of capitalist subjectivity, is not inconsequential. Automobile production in the 1960s was at the center of Italian industrialization due to the privileged position of the auto sector globally. That gave the Autonomia movement an international character from its beginnings, developed through exchanges among autoworkers, activists, and intellectuals in the United States, Italy, Europe, and Latin America. These movements exalted factory labor and implicitly accorded autoworkers a privileged status with regard to the revolutionary project, in a moment when autoworkers' power was indexed to a new era of globalizing capital that was premised on (and promised) a worldwide expansion of consumer culture and an intensification of energy infrastructures.
In other words, the forces at work in the Italian anomaly were also those forces registered in the so-called Great Acceleration, the unprecedented increase in global population, emissions, energy use, automobiles, and numerous other indicators of global change generally represented in the procession of "hockey stick" graphs that now accompany most depictions of the Anthropocene. Even if we may not follow some geologists in identifying this Great Acceleration as marking the definitive onset of the Anthropocene (Steffen et al. 2015) , it undeniably constitutes a critical moment in its advance, both in terms of its drivers and the knowledge infrastructures by which we have come to know it (Pasquinelli, this issue). In this sense workers' power manifests the powers of the Earth, whose accelerating exploitation has brought us to our present crisis. Thus if the vantage point of advanced capitalism enables us to read in Spinoza's thought the historical emergence of the multitude as a political subject, it is from the vantage point of the Anthropocene that we can read in autonomism both the need for and the possibility of a more expansive posthumanist politics.
In this light, the Italian anomaly constitutes both the potential and the limitations of autonomist thought for the Anthropocene. The novelty of Autonomia with regard to the Left establishment inhered in its refusal of the very form of late capitalist life and subjectivity promised by mass automobility, a form of life that also bolstered workers' power. With the diffusion of the struggle from the shop floor throughout the fabric of society, Autonomia revealed that the crisis of the "Italian miracle" was unfolding not only within the production process but also in the bourgeois utopia that the miracle promised. But the insistence on labor power's autonomy reinforced the anthropocentrism underpinning capitalist ideology: instead of a consumerist utopia, autonomism envisioned a society in which the general intellect would be employed toward liberation from work. As evinced in the notion of "immaterial" production and an emphasis on the revolutionary possibilities offered by cognitive and communicative capitalism, the material conditions of this new economy in extractivism and the globalization of manufacturing remained unacknowledged, as did the incorporation of nonhuman life within its communicative and informational orders (see Johnson, this issue). The understanding of human potentiality that inflects Italian autonomism depends on a sharp distinction between life and nonlife, human and nonhuman, and the movement's historical analysis and political imagination rely on a knowable, reliable, "always there" nature that is neither used up nor filled with surprises. That is the same understanding of nature that underpinned the Fordist-Keynesian regime of industrialization against which Autonomia rebelled and which has been thrown into dramatic crisis with the onset of the Anthropocene. In other words, the liberation envisioned in the autonomist movement was the liberation of a particular anthropos situated in a particular locus within global production networks, whose freedom from work depended on an intensified appropriation of nonhuman "work/energy." 2 Autonomia's disengagement from environmental politics was undeniably conditioned by the political context of the 1970s: as Virno (1996: 253) recalls, in contrast to environmental movements elsewhere in Europe, for the Italian Greens "ecologism was born against the class struggles of the 1970s." Virno and other leading theorists of autonomism therefore dismissed environmental anxieties as an ideological displacement of class struggle. 3 And yet it was only on the basis of the ecological and geological forces unleashed in the Great Acceleration that workers' autonomy became thinkable, that the "reduction of work, [through] the intelligent application of technical and scientific knowledge" (Berardi 2007: 158) could become a concrete political possibility. If, as autonomist-feminist theorists argued, the ability for wage labor to appear as the substance of value is predicated on the invisibility of reproductive labor, then the autonomy of the working class was similarly predicated on the occlusion of the nonhuman productivity that gave labor its growing power. In sum, revisiting the Italian anomaly from the vantage point of the Anthropocene indicates that we have never been autonomous.
Instead of reading autonomism's disengagement from ecology as a theoretical gap to be mended, thinking autonomism in the context of the Italian anomaly can help us to discern the material forces animating this thought and to engage them more fully from the perspective of the present. In his reading of Negri's Savage Anomaly, Joost de Bloois brings forth the colonial encounter as a subterranean current that animates Spinoza's conception of the multitude and Negri's reincarnation of it. He writes: "Rather than implying that Spinozism simply bears the hallmark of the advent of modern capitalism . . . Negri conceives of Spinozism as an alternative imagining of the encounter with the New World: not as capitalist savage accumulation . . . but as the endorsement of multiplicity-a different kind of savagery" (de Bloois 2015: 33). To paraphrase de Bloois: How might autonomism stage a different encounter between anthropos and the planetary forces that Stengers (this issue) names Gaia, in the guise of the "one who intrudes"?
Staging such an encounter may mean locating and amplifying tendencies already present in the autonomist tradition that point beyond its tenacious humanism. It most certainly means pushing autonomist thought beyond the limits imposed on it by its historical vantage point and drawing out those implications of its analysis that become visible only in hindsight. One of the enduring strengths of Autonomia has been its insistence on building theory from struggle. Many of its key concepts-the common, potentiality, autonomy, commoning-emerged from the experience of struggles on the factory floor, as workers began to realize and assert their autonomous power and build alternative, noncapitalist spaces and relations. Today the same principle may lead us to invent new concepts or revise old ones that emerge from, and are adequate to, contemporary struggles. In this light the present from which we can reflect on the Italian anomaly is not an abstract Anthropocene but a field of struggle in which new forces, not all of which are human, assert themselves and demand thought.
This methodological commitment may enable us to find within the autonomist tradition some of the theoretical tools essential to both diagnosing and treating its own blindnesses. For instance, when autonomist-feminists such as Silvia Federici, Mariarosa Dalla Costa, and Leopoldina Fortunati demonstrated that wage labor was predicated on a constitutive (and unacknowledged) disproportion between reproduction and production, they indicated a continuity among struggles against capital's dominion over life-activity beyond the purview of the wage. Building on the work of these thinkers, Jason W. Moore (2015) considers colonial expropriation, social reproduction, and the transformation of the nonhuman world to be different manifestations of capital's appropriation of unpaid work/energy, which for him underpins every increase in labor's productivity. Moore thereby places the "resistance" of nonhuman nature (in the form of superweeds, megaviruses, and, above all, climate change) alongside labor's resistance on a single terrain of class struggle (see also Read, this issue). As Federici and other autonomists demonstrated, it was precisely the boundary between reproductive and productive labor-between the interior of capitalist production and its constitutive outside-that was the object of struggle in post-Fordist transition. If Moore encourages us to imagine all forms of anticapitalist resistance (whether human or nonhuman) in terms of class struggle, might we not also interpret all contestations over the relation between life and work, or production and reproduction, as instances of "environmental" politics?
How, then, might the new terrain of struggle named by the Anthropocene prompt us to overhaul our conceptual inheritance from autonomism? We might start, for instance, with the concept of the common and the practice of commoning. For Virno and Cesare Casarino, the common (as distinct from the commons) describes those generic capacities common to humanity as a whole, such as language, thought, and affect. Casarino (2008: 13) thus associates the common with communication as opposed to "community (understood as Gemeinschaft)." This understanding of the common is reflected in Marx's (1964: 44) early descriptions of communism: humans do not live in common "only in the form of some directly communal activity and directly communal enjoyment"; rather, "the individual is the social being. His manifestations of life-even if they may not appear in the direct form of communal life carried out with others-are therefore an expression and confirmation of social life" (45). For Marx, the particular life activity of the individual acts on social products as its material ("as is even the language in which the thinker is active") and is the mechanism for the development of the human species as a whole (44). The common names the repertoire of human capacities that capital seeks to capture and put to work as wage labor, but which can just as readily be turned to other noncapitalist ends. It is thus both immanent to capital and continually exceeds its attempted enclosure as surplus value.
Defined as "thought, language, and affect, in both their potential and actual aspects," Casarino (2008: 13) writes, "for better or worse, the common from its very inception is defined as a universalist concept." This notion of the common thus reinscribes a universal humanity, albeit one that, rather than unifying particularities into an abstract People (or anthropos), describes the opposite motion-"the individualization of the universal, of the generic, of the shared experience" (Virno 2004: 24-25) . For Virno, Casarino, and Marx, however, this preindividual common-like potentiality more generally-is decidedly species-specific, a specificity that is located in the association of the common with linguistic capacities. For instance, the multitude, Virno (2004: 25) writes, finds its unity in the "language, intellect, and communal faculties of the human race." And while Michael Hardt and Negri (2009: 171) call for a general "ecology of the common," they also define the social common (comprising "knowledges, information, images, affects, and social relationships") in contrast to the ecological, on the basis that the former "does not lend itself to a logic of scarcity" (139) that apparently characterizes the latter.
At the same time, however, the common names a potentiality that is historical in character, taking on different powers and characteristics over time, as language, gesture, and habit develop and change. This is most forcefully articulated in Virno's writings, which follow philosophical anthropology to develop an account of the human as that animal that lacks a determinate milieu and is defined by an open and creative process of anthropogenesis (Read, this issue). For Virno, "human nature" and the "common" coincide, the historical development of the former defining the potentiality of the latter. Today, in an age in which the human is so clearly entangled with a wider nonhuman milieu, and where political struggles center on these entanglements and the possibilities they hold, this historical sensibility would seem to demand an expanded notion of the common (see Tola, this issue). 4 Rather than contrasting a (limitless, immaterial) human common to a (finite, earthly) ecological one, we are prompted to reimagine the common as always more than human and simultaneously capacitated and constrained by the concrete formations in which it is manifest.
In other words, it is not enough to extend the "common" to include nonhuman capacities; it is equally as important that the common be understood as immanent to concrete arrangements of existence/existents. Potentiality is never exhausted, but neither is it everywhere the same. Histories of colonialism, racism, and patriarchy have produced widely diverging transindividual collectivities-some far more toxic than others-which cannot simply be conflated into a universal ontology of potentiality. Similarly, we cannot simply assume that capitalism increases the potentiality of the common: these capacities may be irredeemably diminished in a world of social and ecological devastation. The "cramped space" of potentiality outlined by Povinelli (2011) is in this conjuncture also a cramped time, insofar as the horizon of the future has been radically foreshortened by global climate change. In this context, new temporalities of politics may be necessary, requiring in particular that we overcome Autonomia's congenital allergy to the "backward" glance of ecology, a retrospection that is often discredited as nostalgia for a better world in the past. We may instead need to "reclaim" old knowledges and practices as part of a pragmatic and experimental politics of commoning (Stengers, this issue), just as we must also take seriously the limits of solidarity in any commoning project. For if the Anthropocene represents the farcical realization of human autonomy in the form of planetary devastation-in which the "production of man by man" appears to lead to his extinction-then we are forced to recognize that while the multitude may be undeniably more-than-human, not all forms of existence will find common ground within it.
As one of the challenges of the Anthropocene, we are thus faced with the uncomfortable prospect of deciding which forms of existence may need to be extinguished in order to realize our capacities to be in common, including, perhaps, a particular anthropos that drowns out other possible arrangements of being (Kanngieser and Beuret, this issue). This is a problem for which autonomist thought may be well suited, less as a set of theoretical propositions than as a methodology of developing theory from struggle. We close by reiterating this final point, because autonomism's roots in struggle are part of what has endowed it with its remarkable dynamism and ongoing relevance. The nomination of the Anthropocene as a new geologic epoch is not merely a statement about humanity's immense but differentiated impact on earth systems; it also recognizes new sites and subjects of struggle, located no longer only on the factory floor or in the growing cognitariat laboring in the informationalized economies of the present but also in the tangled socioecological webs that make up any mode of production. The strength of autonomism has always been that it has thought from these sites and struggles and has continuously reinvented and revised its theoretical concepts accordingly. Autonomism opens us to the sights and sounds of struggles that we might otherwise overlook, that may not even appear to us as struggles, that confound our vision of revolution-it offers us a new set of "revolutionary glasses" with which to discern a political terrain that remains imperceptible through the lens of conventional politics (Guattari 2007: 237) . In a sense this special issue of South Atlantic Quarterly brings this process into the present, a present in which the inhuman and non human basis of worker power and worker struggles can no longer be ignored, in which the struggle for autonomy from capital can no longer assume the autonomy of the human, and in which colonial and capitalist appropriation and exploitation have left a differentiated world unevenly threatened by rising seas, climate volatility, and toxic natures. What this means for autonomism today, for its concepts and its politics, is the challenge that the Anthropocene urgently poses.
Notes

1
We use the categories "autonomist thought" and "autonomist Marxism" as shorthand for this broad-based movement and its key conceptual and political elements. The category is an Anglophone invention and not widely used or recognized in Italy. 2
On the notion of "work/energy," see Caffentzis (1980 ) 1992 and Moore 2015 The situation in American autonomism was somewhat different. See, e.g., Caffentzis (1980) 1992, which links human and nonhuman resistance through the work/energy crisis of the 1970s. 4
In Commonwealth, Hardt and Negri (2009) occasionally gesture to such an expanded notion of the common (see, for instance, page 171).
